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Abstract
Restriction of market shares of firms in an industry is an instru-
ment of public policy. It is used as part of a strategy in creating a
regulated environment which is expected to lead to a competitive market.
At the firm level, marketing managers use product proliferation strategy
to achieve maximum market success (measured using market share and/or
profit). This strategy is implemented through the choice of appropriate
product positions. The focus of this paper is the analysis of the inter-
play between the implementation of public policy and management strate-
gies.
In particular, we suggest feasible market share restrictions from a
public policy perspective; given these feasible restrictions, we analyze
optimal positioning strategies (both cornering and flanking) from a
managerial perspective. An offshoot of the analysis is that market share
maximization does not always lead to profit maximization, within the
context of our model.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The basic thrust of anti-trust laws is to keep markets free and
competitive. To quote Hughes (1978, p. 40), "The Federal Trade com-
mission (FTC), Department of Justice, and private plaintiffs are using
new criteria of competition, and the converts are adopting these
tests. Profit, market share, product-line extensions , advertising
expenditures, channel strategies, and rate of return—the very heart
of the marketing plan—are part of the tests for competition. . . ."
Marketing strategies to achieve the objectives of maximizing profits
and/or market share have to be formulated within the social
constraints of anti-trust regulation.
Product proliferation (or multiple brand deployment) is a strategy
which can be used for maximizing market share. Notable examples of
companies using product proliferation are Procter and Gamble in the
detergent and shampoo markets, Nestle in the instant coffee market and
Coca-Cola in the soft drink market. If the constraint of anti-trust
regulation on market share is not considered, such multiple product
positioning could lead to litigation. For example, an anti-trust suit
was brought against Kellog, General Foods, General Mills and Quaker
Oats in the RTE cereal market for exerting shared monopoly control.
In this paper, we analyze optimal positioning of products considering
market share restriction as given.
From a public policy viewpoint, these market share restrictions
are intended to promote multi-firm competition in the market. The
selection of the market share limit cannot be done arbitrarily. For
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example, even though DuPont (in 1947) restricted its capacity expan-
sion strategy in the cellophane market under advice from the Justice
Department (in an effort to promote competition), no further entry
occurred initially into this growing market. This suggest that the
market share allowed to a competitior may not be sufficient to support
profitable entry considering cost of entry (approximately, $20,000,000
in this example), thereby thwarting the very purposes of anti-trust
legislation. It is interesting to note that consumers were deprived
of cellophane supply and a "grey market," where some DuPont customers
resold their cellophane at higher prices, arose. In this paper, we
characterize those "feasible" market share restrictions that do not
lead to such anomalies.
The organization of the paper is as follows. A brief review of
the literature on both market pre-emption and anti-trust is provided
in Section 2. The analytical model of the market and competition is
presented in Section 3, where we also show the pre-emptive product
positions when unconstrained by market share restrictions. Section 4
contains the technical analysis, wherein feasible regulatory market
share criteria are derived. Also analyzed therein are the optimal
product positions under feasible anti-trust regulation. Within the
context of our model, we show that the congruence of the profit maxi-
mization strategy with the market share maximization strategy depends
critically on the size of the market and market share restriction
imposed. Section 5 contains a summary of our conclusions.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Based on the theoretical arguments of Porter (1975), and BCG
(1976), and on the empirical support from the PIMS program (Schoeffer,
Buzzell, and Heany (1976)), Hofer and Schendel (1978, p. 128) state:
".
. . it clearly pays to be the dominant firm in an industry. . . ."
A strategy to achieve such market dominance, in a market characterized
by heterogeneous consumer preferences, is brand proliferation. This
strategy (i.e., multiple products aimed at the same market) is one
that has long been practiced by some very successful firms, as men-
tioned in the introduction.
The literature on dominant firms focuses on multi-product strate-
gies as non-price competitive options. The state of the art here
(White, 1983) provides very general guidelines to managers, which are
very helpful, but does not contain any analytical basis for choosing
optimal product positions.
The economics literature, on the facility location problem, is a
source of analytic positioning theories on which we build our posi-
tioning analysis. The famous duopoly location model of Hotelling
(1929) and the plant location model of Losch (1954) form the basis of
much of the subsequent work in location or positioning in econimics,
including that of Prescott and Visscher (1977), and Eaton and Lipsey
(1979). Prescott and Visscher (1977) construct an equilibrium model
of firms in which the firms locate themselves sequentially in a
market. Once positioned they are not allowed to reposition. Further,
all firms are assumed able (with perfect foresight) to correctly pre-
dict the influence its decisions will have on the firms yet to enter.
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Their solution shows the equilibrium position that may be used by the
first entrant to establish a monopoly. They, however, do not allow
for product repositioning or for market growth. Neither do they
derive the minimum number of brands a firm needs to enter to pre-empt
the market.
Eaton and Lipsey (1979) consider a spatial market with increasing
market demand. Under such conditions, they show that existing firms
should pre-empt the market by establishing new plants before the time
when it would pay new firms to enter. Given that they study plant
location, they also do not allow for repositioning.
Gruca, Kumar, and Sudharshan (1985), following Prescott and
Visscher (1977) and Eaton and Lipsey (1979), derive the minimum number
of products and their positions required to pre-empt competitive entry
in market segments, whose sizes are stable, increasing or decreasing.
General rules for obtaining such positions under varying consumer pre-
ference distributions, segment sizes, forecasting uncertainty, and
cost of entry are provided therein.
None of the research cited above explicitly consider constraints
on monopolization via anti-trust legislation and regulation. While
the motivation for the Eaton and Lipsey (1979) paper was the judgement
against Aluminum Company of America (ALCOA) by Judge Learned Hand,
their focus was on demonstrating the presence of excess capacity,
whether or not the dominant firm was allowed to monopolize a growing
market.
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The case against ALCOA was based on its use of building capacity
in order to monopolize the market. That against the four RTE cereal
manufacturers was based on their creation of entry barriers via brand
proliferation (leading to high advertising costs). Both these cases
were brought about as violations of the Sherman Act. Under Section 2
of this act, it is a violation for a firm to (1) monopolize, (2)
attempt to monopolize, or (3) conspire to monopolize any market
(Corley, Reed, and Black, 1984, p. 321).
The measurement of market dominance is usually done via market
share appraisals. According to Judge Hand (in the ALCOA case), "[over
90%] is enough to constitute monopoly; it is doubtful whether 60 or
64% would be enough; and certainly 33% is not enough." If for the
moment, one were to agree with this statement, and set the market
share limit to, say, 90%, is it obvious that such a law would induce
profitable entry? Schmalansee (1978), analyzing the RTE cereal
market, suggests that 3% - 5% is sufficient for profitable entry.
Implicit in these suggestions (of maximum market share restrictions or
minimum entry supportive share) is the assumption that the market size
is large enough so that contributions generated are greater than the
fixed costs of entry. The DuPont case, referred to earlier, is an
example where these assumptions may have been violated.
In the next section we introduce a market model to permit an anal-
ysis of both the product positioning strategies under a market share
limit, and the market share limit that would allow profitable com-
petitive entry.
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3. MODEL
In developing our analysis, following Gruca, Kumar and Sudharshan
(1985), we make some assumptions regarding competitive behavior, beha-
vior of costs, and the nature of consumer demand distributions. We
start with a strategist who is allowed to introduce a set of products
for this market that is both jointly ,'optimal ,, and will dissuade com-
petitors from entering their products (by making such competitive
entries unprofitable). Constraints on market share will be introduced
and taken care of in the next section.
The strategist is planning for a time horizon over which average
total demand is assumed to be constant. When such demand changes the
strategist is assumed to plan anew. We take the vantage point of the
strategist who enters the first product(s) for this segment. Others
are treated as followers, who react by positioning products (if at
all) based on the actions of the leader.
Consumer demand is assumed to be a function of product charac-
teristics. In our analysis we consider the case of a product class
defined on one characteristic (or two related characteristics). Each
product has associated with it a fixed cost (L). We assume that this
fixed cost as well as unit variable cost is the same for all firms
(whether leader or follower) and for all products. Competition for
share of consumer demand is based strictly on product characteristic
differences. We assume that any price charged by a brand (or firm)
will be met by its competitors, and this pricing strategy is common
knowledge to all potential entrants.
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Without any loss of generality it is assumed that the range of
characteristic values have been rescaled to be in ( - , -~r).
Consumer tastes are associated with levels of this characteristic and
each consumer is assumed to buy one unit. The distribution of consumer
—KL KL
tastes is given by the rescaled density f(°0 = 1, where —5— < cc < —-.
Each consumer is assumed to buy the product positioned closest to his
2
taste level. The total demand for this market is, therefore, KL.
Profit for a product for a given period is given by II = (CM * a *
KL - L)
,
(where CM, the unit contribution margin, is constant, equal to
one for ease of exposition, and a is the market share for that
product)
.
For each period, the leader's strategist is assumed to estimate
the market demand KL. With L as the fixed cost per product, and a
unit contribution of one, the maximum number of products that may be
supported by this market (i.e., its size) is K. The estimate of K
that the leader obtains from his estimation of KL is K , termed esti-
mate of market size. We assume that such estimation is done for only
one period at a time, and further allow for estimation errors causing
K to be different from K.
The leader is assumed to have perfect foresight regarding the
optimal positions chosen by the follower given its own actions
(positions chosen). So, given its estimation of segment size K and
the number of products it wishes to enter, the leader can compute
both its optimal positions and those of the followers who will enter
such that all these products together pre-empt any further entry.
Eaton and Lipsey (1979), Prescott and Visscher (1977), Lane (1980),
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Sudharshan and Kumar (1984) and Sudharshan (1984) show how such com-
putations may be performed. The profits that accrue to such positions
are also known and it is further assumed that only products that would
3
produce positive profits are feasible for entry.
For the case of the pre-emptive monopolist, the following general
rules of product positioning were shown in Gruca, Kumar, and
Sudharshan (1985):
4
General Rule 1 : For K = (2N-1) (where N is any positive interger)
,
the maximum number of products that can theoretically be supported
by this market is (2N-2). But, it is both necessary and sufficient to
enter only N products to pre-empt this entire market.
The entry deterring product positions need to satisfy the
following conditions: (i) the distance between a product and the
corresponding end point of the segment should be < L, and (ii) the
distance between any two adjacent brands should be < 2L.
General Rule 2 : When K = 2N (where N is any positive integer),
while (2N-1) products can apparently be supported by this market,
only _N are needed for market pre-emption. The pre-emptive positions
must satisfy the conditions (i) and (ii) of General Rule 1.
The positioning rules are similar to those in Prescott and
Visscher (1977, example 2). The following is an example illustrating
these rules for the case where 4 < K < 6.
Three products are necessary and sufficient to pre-empt entry by
another product for this case. The symmetric strategy is to position
(as in Figure 1) a product at the center, and the other two products,
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each at a distance d on either side of the center where d lies in the
interval (L(|-l), 2L)
.
-d
- KL
2
KL
2
Figure 1: Symmetric Strategy Positions
The asymmetric strategy is to position the three brands as in Figure
2, such that d
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Figure 2: Asymmetric Strategy Positions
These positions pre-empt entry to the sides of the extreme brands and
between any pair of adjacent brands, thus satisfying the strategist's
objective of profitable pre-emption. The limiting asymmetric posi-
tions coincide with the limiting symmetric positions as K + 6. This
unique pre-empting strategy is: position one brand at the center and
the other two, each distance 2L away from the center, on either side
of it.
Having discussed a model of pre-emptive product positioning,
without incorporating regulartory constraints, we take up the task of
explicitly incorporating anti-trust regulations of the forms that
restrict maximum market share in the next section.
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4. ANALYSIS OF FEASIBLE RESTRICTION POLICIES AND POSITIONING
STRATEGIES
In this section we first present a characterization of feasible
market share restrictions. Given the existence of such a feasible
market share restriction in a market, we then develop and discuss the
various pre-emptive product positioning alternatives available for
that market. Such pre-emptive positioning is a market share maxi-
mizing solution. Profit maximization may, however, be the objective
pursued. Therefore, to complete this section, we then discuss the
issue of whether constrained market share maximizing product positions
are also profit maximizing ones.
4.1 Feasible Market Share Restriction
Market share has been widely used as a criteria to detect domi-
nance in industries. Judge Hand (in the ALCOA case) opined that
90% share was definitely sufficient to constitute a monopoly, while
33% was definitely not sufficient. Let us consider the institution
(for the purpose of ensuring multiple firm presence in a market) of a
restriction on the market share permissible to a company to be 90%.
Further, consider a marketing manager who is choosing positions of the
products to introduce into the market with the aim of acquiring the
maximum allowable market share. Let the fixed cost of entry be
$20,000,000 (as in the DuPont example mentioned in Section 2).
Suppose the market size was $260,000,000. In terras of the model
in Section 3, L, the fixed cost is $20,000,000 and K the market size
parameter is 13. From general rule 1 of the previous section, the
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marketing manager could choose to position his brands as in Figure 3.
2A 1G IF IE ID 1C IB 1A
r t t r Y y y y
L ,6L .4L 2L 2L 2L 2L 2L L
- \13_L + 13L
2 2
Figure 3: Feasible Market Share Restriction
The first firm has seven products labeled 1A through 1G, allowing a
second firm to enter product 2A with a market share of 10%. If 2A
were positioned closer to 1G, it would allow an entrant (3A) at the
old 2A position, thus making 2A unprofitable. Firm 1 has therefore
achieved its objective of attaining the maximum possible market share
of 90% and anti-trust regulation has succeeded in ensuring multiple
firm entry.
Suppose, on the other hand, that the market size was $160,000,000,
with the same fixed cost of $20,000,000, i.e., K is now 8. The
marketing manager for firm 1 could choose product positions as in
Figure 4 (following general rule 2 of Section 3) to achieve 90% market
share, if firm 2 entered product 2A as shown in Figure 4.
IE ID 1C 2A IB
T Y T T +
1A
2L .4L 1.6L 2L
-
_8L
2
+8L
2
Figure 4: Infeasible Market Share Restriction
While the product positions of Figure 4 would allow firm 1 to have
a market share of 90% if firm 2 entered product 2A, this solution is
not feasible. Intuitively, this is true because obtaining 10% of the
market will not cover the fixed cost of entry for product 2A. This is
-12-
clearly a case where the regulation does not achieve the desired
results of multiple firm entry. For multiple firm entry to occur in
this case, firm 1 has to lower its market share objective/target to
less than 87.5% (allowing a new entrant to obtain a share greater than
12.5%, i.e., a contribution greater than $20,000,000. Therefore, in
this example, any market share restriction between 87.5% and 100% will
not result in multiple firm entry, and therefore will be a self-
defeating regulation.
Alternatively, under a 90% market share restriction, multiple firm
entry can occur if the fixed cost of entry for firm 2 is lowered by
more than $4,000,000 to less than $16,000,000. This will make product
2A profitable and firm 1 can achieve its objective.
Notice that in the example depicted in Figure 4, firm 1 obtained
100% of the market even though it tries to obtain only 90% of it. Yet
another way of enforcing this 90% market share restriction is to force
firm 1 to have a capacity sufficient to serve not more than 90% of the
market (similar to the restriction placed on DuPont in the cellophane
market in 1947). In such a case, 10% of the market is not served by
firm 1 and since no other firm can profitably enter this market, this
10% of the market remains unserved.
Firm 1 has, therefore, 100% share of the served market. To ensure
that it is not in violation of anti-trust, firm 1 could subsidize
another firm to an extent that makes entry by this second firm profi-
table. This is a possible explanation for DuPont designing and
building a production plant for Olin Industries (Fleming, 1972).
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This leads to the following general considerations governing the
choice of maximum market share allowable, 3, by public policy makers:
i) the first entrant must be profitable, i.e., if it enters m pro-
ducts to achieve share 3, then 3KL > mL.
ii) another entry is also profitable, i.e., (1-3)KL > L.
For any firm to enter m products, it requires a minimum entry suppor-
tive share, given by 3 . = — + e. If 3 is set to comply with the above
' min K r J
considerations as in the example depicted in Figure 3, then it is
termed feasible.
4.2 Constrained Product Positioning Strategies
Given a feasible market share restriction 3, the market share
maximizing marketing manager of the first firm can position his pro-
ducts according to either a "cornering" or a "flanking" strategy. The
former allows competitive entry in a corner of the market. The latter
calls for allowing competition between two self products. The posi-
tions associated with these strategies are discussed next.
A. Cornering
In this strategy the manager forces the new entrant to serve a
corner of the linear market by making him position his product at a
distance L from an end of the market. The first firm would enter as
many products (N) as are necessary to pre-empt the entire market (see
the general rules of Section 3). The positions of these products
would be as follows:
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i) One product should be positioned at a distance less than or equal
to L from an end point,
ii) The other products should be positioned at a distance less than
or equal to 2L from one another,
iii) The product closest to the other end should be located at a
distance of L + 2(1-6—)KL from that end.
K.
This strategy is demonstrated in Figure 5 for N = 3 and 4 < K < 6.
1A IB 1C 2A
I + + +
<L < 2L L
KL 2(1-3—)KL kL
~2 K
2
Figure 5: Cornering Strategy Example
Such a strategy allows firm 1 to capture 6 share of the market, both
firms 1 and 2 to be profitable, and pre-empts entry by other firms.
B. Flanking Strategy
Such a strategy allows the second firm's product to be entered
between two of the first firm's products. In other words, the first
firm's products flank the second firm's product. Here again, the
first firm would enter as many products (N) as are necessary to pre-
empt the entire market.
The positions of these products would be as follows:
i) One product should be positioned at a distance < L from each
other,
ii) The distance between any two of firms l's products should be
*> 2L, except between the products that are to flank firms 2's
product.
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iii) The distance between the flanker products should be 2(l-tf)KL.
Figure 6 shows an example of the strategy for N=3 and 4 < K < 6.
1A 2(1-3)KL IB 1C
4-
<L <2L <L
- KL + KL
2 2
Figure 6: Flanking Strategy Example
In general, the first firm's marketing manager can choose either
the cornering or the flanking strategy as long as 6 is feasible.
However, it makes no sense to talk about a choice between these stra-
tegies for K < 3 (as the market can support no more than two
products). In choosing between cornering and flanking a manager may
favor the former, when there are significant benefits from interpro-
duct synergy due to product closeness. Flanking strategy would be
preferred, on the other hand, if the manager believes that the regula-
tion maybe relaxed or abolished. This is because the flanker products
can be repositioned to squeeze the second firm's product. In the cor-
nering strategy the second firm's product is always assured of reve-
nues greater than L.
4.3 Market Share vs. Profit Maximization
We have thus far assumed that the manager is a market share maxi-
mizer. In such a case the number of products (N) that he should enter
is the number necessary to pre-empt the entire market. In the case of
no market share restriction, this N product solution is also the pro-
fit maximizing solution. If however anti-trust regulations stipulate
a market share ceiling, then this market share maximizing N product
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solution need not necessarily maximize profit also. The following
example illustrates this observation.
Consider a market with K = 4.5. We need 3 products (N=3) to pre-
empt the market. With feasible 3 restrictions, the market share maxi-
mizing positioning is shown in Figure 7.
1A
4-
2A IB 1C
+
<L <2L <L
- 4.5L 9(1-8)L 4.5L
Figure 7: Market Share Maximizing Positions
Although in this example we have chosen a flanking strategy, the cor-
nering strategy gives similar profits for firm 1 of (4.5fcSL-3L) . For
the same market, the profit maximizing solution for firm 1 when it
enters only two products is shown in Figure 8.
1A
+
IB
+
2A
2L
- 4.5L 4.5L
2 2
Figure 8: Profit Maximizing Positions
The profit for firm 1 in this case is (3.25L - 2L - 1.25L). If 3 is
set to be the maximum feasible 6 for this K (i.e., set at 1 —;
—
= 77)
,
4.5 9
then the profit from the market share maximizing positions is 0.5L
which is less than 1.25L, the profit obtained by entering just two
products.
In general, the profit obtained from positioning to maximize
market share is given by
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Pl = (3K - N)L, where 3 is feasible and N is the minimum
number of products required to pre-empt as given by the general rules
in Section 3. The maximum profits from positioning only (N - 1) pro-
ducts is given by
P2 = (N-2)L, where N has the same meaning as before
As in the example depicted in Figures 7 and 8, PI need not be
greater than P2. The market share maximizing strategy is also the pro-
fit maximizing strategy under certain combinations of K and 3 only.
INSERT FIGURE 9 HERE
Figure 9 shows the relationship between (PI - P2) and K, when 6 is
chosen to be the maximum feasible for each K. For 2 < K < 3 , PI - P2 is
negative, implying that the market share maximizing strategy is less
profitable than the one using one less product. The market share
maximizing strategy is also profit maximizing for 3 < K < 4. Similar
regions alternate for K > 4. If however, a different 3 is chosen by
policy makers (where 3 is less than the maximum feasible 3), it is
possible that even for 3 < K < 4 (and similar regions), the market
share maximizing strategy will not be profit maximizing. An example
of this is shown in Figure 10, where 3 is chosen to be 2/3 of the maxi-
mum feasible 3.
INSERT FIGURE 10 HERE
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5. CONCLUSION
Restriction of market shares of firms in an industry is an instru-
ment of public policy. It is used as part of a strategy in creating a
regulated environment which is expected to lead to a competitive market.
At the firm level, marketing managers use product proliferation strategy
to achieve maximum market success (measured using market share and/or
profit). This strategy is implemented through the choice of appropriate
product positions. The focus of this paper has been the analysis of the
interplay between the implementation of public policy and management
strategies.
The feasibility of institutionalizing market share restrictions
without regard to market size and entry cost is questioned. We have
provided simple criteria for the choice of maximum feasible market
share restraints to permit multiple firm entry. Our analysis also
provided a possible explanation for the need of a subsidy (providing
technology and construction aid) to Olin Industries to enter a product
to compete with DuPont in the cellophane market.
We have discussed the flanking and cornering alternative strategies
available to a marketing manager in developing positioning strategy in a
regulated market with feasible share restrictions. We have also shown
that the dilemma of choosing between a flanking and a cornering strategy
may be resolved using synergy or regulatory uncertainty considerations.
Finally, we show that market share maximizing product positioning,
within the context of our model, does not always lead to profit maxi-
mizing also. Whether the same strategy results in the maximization of
both profit and market share is shown to depend critically on the market
size K, and the market share restriction imposed.
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Footnotes
By two related characteristics, we mean the existence of a tech-
nological constraint of the form f(w,z) = 1, where w and z are the
levels of the two characteristics of any product and f is a homeo-
morphism.
2
Runyon (1982, pp. 355) states: "Many markets can be segmented on
the basis of price; the automobile market is a prime example. Used in
this way, pricing strategy is an effective device for appealing to a
particular economic segment of the total market."
3
In general the characteristic space (relevant for this segment)
may be the interval [a,b] with a total segment demand KL, i.e., the
* KL
consumer density function f(ct) = K_a « This is readily transformed by
, KL/ KL(a+b) . , , KL KL, . .
a = (—
—
)a —-—r- to a rescaled space [ ~, —rj with a consumerb-a 2(b-a) r 2 2
density function f(ot)=l and segment demand KL. This transformation is
linear and uniquely invertible. Therefore, given a position ex in re-
scaled space the corresponding characteristic value can be uniquely
and easily obtained.
4
We use the terms product and brands interchangeably throughout
our discussion.
Given N the minimum number of pre-emptive products, the maximum
profits obtainable from positioning only M products, where M < N - 1,
is given by (M-l)L, which increases with M. Therefore, maximum profit-
ability entails positioning at least N-l products.
O.f; -a
r,
N
H
N
n
K
w
H
11)
MARKET SIZE K
Figure 9: Relationship between (PI - P2) and
K under (3 =
max
19
MARKET SIZE I
Figure 10: Relationship of (PI - P2) and
K under 6=2/3 B
max
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